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ABSTRACT
LOVETERE, MARIA
Roma in the European Union: Structural Barriers to
Fundamental Rights. Departments of Political Science and Russian and Eastern European
Studies, June 2019.
ADVISOR: David Siegel and Kristin Bidoshi
This thesis focuses on the effects of European Union expansion on Roma
populations throughout Europe. The EU instituted a number of policies intended to help
European Roma, one of the most persecuted minority groups on the continent, but rather
than significantly improving quality of life for this population, in many places relations
between Roma and greater European society have worsened. I introduce the topic by
reviewing the legal frameworks created for this purpose, and discussing existing literature
that examines the pitfalls of EU Roma policies.
Next, I argue that through europeanization and profit-oriented migration policies,
the EU has furthered the marginalization of Roma across Europe and created an
atmosphere unsympathetic to Roma issues. I analyze the identity frame of Roma
promoted by europeanization, which allows states and EU administrative bodies to divert
responsibility for helping Roma populations. I then illustrate the ways in which EU
migration policy sidelines impoverished groups in favor of skilled workers. This practice
disproportionately harms Roma migrants, who commonly work within the scope of the
informal economy, and allows for expulsions and other discriminatory practices to
persist. I conclude my argument by reiterating the ways in which EU Roma policy has
had the opposite of its intended effect, and suggest ways to correct the deficiencies of
current measures.
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I.

Introduction

The Roma people are historically one of the most persecuted populations in
Europe. During the Holocaust between 220,000 and 500,000 Roma were exterminated in
Eastern and Central Europe under the Nazi regime, and thousands more were targeted in
Western Europe under collaborationist regimes.1 Racially based prejudice was bolstered
by scientific research that determined the Roma to be inherently criminal in nature,
“primitive,” and “incapable of real social adaptation.”2 After the Holocaust, animosity
towards the Roma did not weaken, and similar racialized sentiments continued to pervade
European society. In Central and Eastern Europe, where the majority of Roma
populations resided, communist governments instituted strict assimilation and integration
policies aimed at subduing the ethnic conflicts that riddled post-war Europe.3 These
policies, far from eliminating racial prejudice, quelled tensions to a manageable level
until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when communism in the region began to
disintegrate. In the post-communist period, Central and Eastern Europe’s Roma were
subjected to violent discrimination under the newly established governments, further
marginalizing them from greater society.4
With the expansion of the European Union (EU) to include more Central and
Eastern European nations, community relations with the Roma were expected to improve,
based on initiatives put in place to combat racial and ethnic discrimination and steep

1

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Sinti and Roma: Victims of the Nazi Era,” Washington
D.C.: 10, 11.
2
Ibid, 7.
3
Z. Barany, “Politics and the Roma in state-socialist Eastern Europe,” Communist and Post-Communist
Studies 33, (2000): 422.
4
D. M. Crowe, “The Roma in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Questions of Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic
Peace,” Nationalities Papers 36, no. 3 (2008): 521.
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human rights contingencies for membership.5 However, EU efforts to address the “Roma
problem” have had limited success, and in many ways have aggravated tensions between
Roma and other Europeans.
Early on in the EU’s expansion process, the race equality directive and the
citizens’ rights directive were instrumental in securing fundamental rights for European
Roma, as well as a myriad of other minority groups across Europe. After the accession of
prominent Eastern European states between 2004 and 2007, strategies intended
specifically for ameliorating Roma hardships saturated EU discourse. A 2010
communication from the European Commission (EC) on the Social and Economic
Integration of the Roma in Europe galvanized member states’ concern for Roma matters,
and was followed in 2011 by an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies
(NRIS).
The race equality directive required that all EU member states put into place
regulations prioritizing the prevention of racial and ethnic discrimination, and provide
avenues for victims of discrimination to seek recompense. The document stipulates that
employment, education, housing, healthcare, and access to social programs—among
other public services—must be available to all persons regardless of racial origin.
Additionally, the directive obliges member states to establish legal structures devoted to
the protection of victims’ rights and national administrative bodies charged with carrying
out the EU’s requirements.6

5

P. Vermeersch, “How Does the EU Matter for the Roma? Transnational Roma Activism and EU Social
Policy Formation,” Problems of Post-Communism 64, no. 5 (2017): 220.
6
The Council of the European Union, “Implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (Directive 2000/43/EC),” Directive, 2000.
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While the language of the race equality directive does not explicitly single out the
Roma, the EU announced in 2002 that a main goal of the directive was to combat
widespread discrimination against Roma in candidate countries.7 Later, in 2013, the
Council of the European Union issued a recommendation for the directive to be expanded
upon, in order to better cater to the needs of the Roma people and to better ensure
implementation of directive policies.8 Since its creation, the race equality directive has
been cited readily in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to identify
discriminatory practices against Roma in member states.9
Amidst the successes of this directive, there were also deficiencies within the
document that left spaces for member states to persist with anti-Roma legislation.
Chapter 1, Article 3(2) states:
This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality
and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry
into and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the
territory of Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the legal
status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned.10
This provision has negative ramifications for the treatment of all immigrants and stateless
people, but especially so for the Roma due to the ambiguous nature of their citizenship
within the EU.11

7

C. Cahn, “Racial Preference, Racial Exclusion: Administrative Efforts to Enforce the Separation of Roma
and Non-Roma in Europe through Migration Controls,” European Journal of Migration and Law 5, (2004):
488.
8
The Council of the European Union, “On effective roma integration measures in the Member States,”
Recommendation, 2013.
9
B. K. Blitz, “Evaluating Transitions: Human Rights and Qualitative Democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 9 (2011): 1748.
10
Directive 2000/43/EC, article 3(2).
11
Cahn, 489.
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Where the race equality directive lacked traction in the realm of migration, the
citizens’ rights directive focused primarily on securing individuals’ rights to free
movement within the territories of the EU. This directive differentiates between the
requirements for residence of employed and unemployed persons, outlines the conditions
for family members of Union citizens to sustain residence, specifies the grounds on
which residence rights can be restricted, clarifies the proper uses for visas, identity cards,
and passports, explains the requirements for obtaining the status of a permanent resident,
and guarantees the equal treatment of residents abiding by the rules of the directive.12 The
most consequential aspect of the citizens’ rights directive for European Roma has been
the protections it offers against forced and automatic expulsions. Under the directive,
expulsions can only take place on an individual basis, and only after the individual in
question is proven to pose a substantial threat to the society in which he/she resides. This
key component is included to combat mass expulsions based on national identification,
an occurrence that disproportionately endangers Roma.13
The EU framework for national Roma integration strategies (NRIS) up to 2020
codified the requirement that all EU member states and candidate countries individually
develop plans for integrating their Roma populations. The EC reiterated the rights
ensured by the race equality directive—equal access to education, employment,
healthcare, housing, utilities, and social services—but with special emphasis on the
distinct problems faced by Roma, including forced evictions and segregation of children

12

The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, “On the rights of citizens of the Union
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (Directive
2004/38/EC),” Directive, 2004.
13
J. S. Gehring, “Free Movement for Some: The Treatment of the Roma after the European Union’s
Eastern Expansion,” European Journal of Migration and Law 15, (2013): 15.
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within school systems. The communication in which NRIS’s were proposed specifies that
member states appoint Roma representatives and civil society organizations as advisors
to the development and implementation of each respective strategy. Moreover, the EC
asked that states identify sources from where funding would be allocated, and ordered
members to provide the EU with regular progress reports and submit to monitoring by
administrative bodies.14 The establishment of binding mandates for the protection of
Roma rights in member states represent an important step in the process towards equality,
but significant improvements in Roma life have been scarce.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine why the systems put in place by the EU
to protect Roma have failed. In the subsequent chapters, I will first give an overview of
existing rationales for the EU’s failures, and propose two alternative explanations that I
will then analyze more thoroughly. In the first chapter, I will argue that EU expansion—
in concert with the popularization of post-national Roma citizenship—has led member
states to take less responsibility for Roma migrants and citizens residing in their territory.
In addition to perceiving themselves as absolved of responsibility, member states
outsource blame for abuses of Roma fundamental rights to poorer member states, where
Roma originate, and the EU itself. This is true of the most prominent member states in
the EU, including France, Italy, and Sweden. Furthermore, I will show how the
assumption that the EU should adopt full responsibility for Roma migrants—and Union
citizens in general—is groundless, through court cases heard in the ECHR. These include
Aydarov and Others v. Bulgaria, Kósa v. Hungary, and Cazacliu and Others v. Romania.
In my second chapter, I will turn to the economic motivation behind the citizens’ rights
14

European Commission, “An EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020,”
Communication, Brussels, 2011.
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directive, to illustrate how it is designed to be advantageous for wealthy Union citizens,
and disadvantageous for poor Union citizens. More specifically, I will focus on the
restrictions on social welfare systems for Union citizens and the ways it indirectly targets
Roma, using cases from Germany and Belgium. Then, I will look at how begging is
interpreted as a threat to public safety, security, and health, and consequently justifies
expulsion of impoverished migrants, including Roma. To do this I will analyze begging
bans in Austria and Denmark. Finally, I will discuss the implications of EU failures to
protect Roma rights, in light of the explanations I provide.

7

II.

Failures to Protect Roma Rights in the EU

While disagreeing on the reasons that EU efforts have yielded subpar results for
Roma, authors generally explain these failures within the scope of five main analytical
frames: weak implementation of directives, weak Western European models, deficiency
of Roma political participation, ingrained prejudice and the rise of nationalism, and the
weakening of the human rights regime. After outlining the main ideas of each of these
frameworks, I will introduce two—more systemic—problems that have resulted in these
failures. First, I will argue that the expansion of the EU and creation of Union citizens has
facilitated the abuse of Roma nationals by their respective states. Next, I will argue that
the economic motives fueling free movement have created avenues for states to neglect
Roma migrants who claim residence under the precipices of the citizens’ rights directive.

Existing Frameworks
Weak Implementation of Directives in Member States
Although there are many protocols in place and various minority rights
organizations to assist with the development of Roma equality, implementation of
transnational frameworks at the national level has consistently been a hindrance to the
achievement of this goal. Authors examining the effectiveness of EU anti--discrimination
and Roma integration policies have remarked, across the board, that lack of
implementation has precluded the success of these strategies.
In her analysis of the 2010 mass Roma expulsions by the French government,
Jacqueline Gehring focuses on how the citizens’ rights directive failed to protect the
rights of Roma migrants from Romania and Bulgaria that were deported. She argues that

8

the EU has been unable to ensure full implementation of EU directives by member states,
resulting in the continuation of discriminatory practices. Gehring writes, “In particular,
many Member States have not fully implemented proper processes for expulsion. Instead,
some Member States use cash payments to encourage individuals to voluntarily leave the
country, or task local governments with enacting expulsions,” as was the case in France.15
In spite of this, EU officials have publicly announced that implementation of the citizens’
rights directive and other frameworks in member states has been successful thus far.
Gehring further claims that full implementation of anti-discriminatory frameworks would
require continual oversight by EU administrative bodies, which—while promised—“has
rarely been uniformly or vigorously pursued.”16 Brad Blitz similarly shows evidence of
this in Slovakia and Slovenia, where norms and standards of democratic human rights
protection imposed by the EU were established at the national level, but lacked adherence
and actualization in the justice sector.17
In addition to lackluster implementation procedures, the conditionality approach
to candidate states has muddied the effectiveness of directive transposition. Blitz and
Peter Vermeersch contend that conditionality agreements further human rights norms in
acceding countries, while simultaneously allowing violations to persist after accession
dates and within existing member states. Blitz explains:
Some scholars question governmental willingness to promote substantive
political change, charging that once the incentives had been met for EU
membership and countries had acceded to the European Union, momentum
for reform was lost. Rather, conditionality was arguably seen as a shortterm approach which became less effective once the accession date was set
and the EU accepted the candidate’s set of reforms as sufficient.18
15

Gehring, 19.
Ibid, 20.
17
Blitz, 1763.
18
Ibid, 1748, 1749.
16
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Vermeersch emphasizes another difficulty with conditionality, owing the meager
adherence to human rights norms to the uneven requirements varying between candidate
states. He explains that EU directives were more successful in states that already had preexisting strategies for addressing human rights violations, and remained neglected in
states that had no prior concern for such issues.19 Along with drawing conditionality into
question, Vermeersch and Blitz’s points give weight to Gehring’s scrutiny of the EU’s
enforcement of appropriate implementation.

Weak Western European Models
In this same article Gehring also postulates that low standards set by more
established Western European members minimize the pressure placed on transitioning
states to devote resources to human rights concerns—especially in the case of Roma
rights. As evidence, she continues to expand on the failures of the EU in the wake of
France’s 2010 expulsions, pointing directly to the European Commission’s decision to
not follow through with infringement procedures against the French government.20
Instead, the Commission vehemently condemned France’s actions in the public sphere,
and declared the issue resolved when the national government agreed to fully implement
their transposed citizens’ rights directive. Gehring comments:
Indeed, it would appear that many non-governmental actors were pleased
the Commission had taken such a public stand against France, even if it was
unable to guarantee full compliance with the free movement directive. This
reaction underlines both the relatively weak position that minority groups
claiming rights against powerful Member States hold, as well as the limited

19
20

Vermeersch (2017), 220.
Gehring, 18.
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expectations, and actual power of the Commission when confronting
powerful Member States.21
Along the same lines, Melanie Ram suggests that the abysmal treatment of Roma in
Central and Eastern Europe—especially in candidate and recently acceded states—is not
the result of discrepancies between these states and the values of the EU, but are instead a
mirroring of the policies and practices that are dominant in Western Europe. In a clear
example of this, Ram remarks on the conspicuous similarities between rhetoric used to
decry Roma during 2011 demonstrations in the Czech Republic, and the language used to
identify Roma in France’s most recent election cycle. In both cases, the word
‘undesirables’ was used interchangeably with ‘Roma.’22

Deficiency of Roma Political Participation
Although numerous forums for Roma political participation have been instituted
at the transnational, national, and local levels, inadequate representation by Roma
delegates and the marginalization of Roma concerns present obstacles to Roma
integration via authentic political involvement. In their analysis of Slovenia’s inclusion of
Roma councillors in local governance, Irena Baclija and Miro Haček touch on both of
these hindrances. They note the internal conflicts caused by rivalries among competing
clans, and the resulting antagonisms among appointed officials that diminish their ability
to represent a locality’s Roma constituency.23 Zoltan Barany similarly emphasizes the
discrepancies among Roma representatives, and traces this back to the diversity of Roma

21

Ibid, 20.
M. H. Ram, “Europeanized Hypocrisy: Roma Inclusion and Exclusion in Central and Eastern Europe,”
Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13, no. 3 (2014): 34.
23
I. Baclija and M. Haček, “Limited Opportunities for Political Participation: A Case Study of Roma Local
Councillors in Slovenia,” Romani Studies 5, no. 17 (2007): 173.
22
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populations within municipalities and states.24 Moreover, these authors point out that
Roma people have traditional ways of appointing leaders that do not correspond with the
election of political representatives, and a deep-rooted mistrust of authority that makes
individuals reluctant to engage with government officials. Barany writes, “Most
traditional leaders have been reluctant to interact with white politicians, primarily for
cultural reasons. They prefer to communicate with the gadge (non-Roma) through
intermediaries, educated Roma who have proved to be successful in both cultures.”25
Even in situations where Roma representatives are supported by the electorate, the
percentage of these officials in power compared to non-Roma representatives is still
extremely low. This is especially true in states with large Roma populations like Bulgaria
and Slovakia.26 Ram contends that these small percentages and weak efforts to increase
the number of Roma representatives are hallmarks of tokenism within EU Roma policy.
She notes that in some instances, Roma delegates are not even elected by Roma
populations themselves, bringing their legitimacy into question.27 Baclija and Haček also
include in their study a survey of Roma councillors and their non-Roma counterparts,
regarding the nature of discussion about Roma issues within local councils. The results of
this survey show a disinterest among non-Roma about acting on behalf of Roma causes,
and the corresponding inability of the few Roma officials to affect change for their
constituents.28 Konstantia Koutouki and Doris Farget take this observation a step further,
arguing that the structure of democratic decision making bodies inherently aid the

24

Z. Barany, “Ethnic Mobilization and the State: the Roma in Eastern Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies
21, no. 2 (1998): 315.
25
Ibid, 316.
26
Vermeersch, (2017), 219.
27
Ram, 30.
28
Baclija and Haček, 169.
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exclusion of Roma opinions from discourse, because of the disproportionate amount of
power allocated to majority groups. They explain:
The legal normativity that establishes a right to participation in political
decision making for minority and indigenous peoples tends to reproduce the
illusion of inclusion within democratic societies. In actuality, however, the
overriding importance conferred on the interests of the dominant group
confines participation by marginalised groups to the periphery of the
system.29
Roma officials and civil society actors have protested this facade of participation by
resigning from their respective deliberative bodies and making public objections to EU
administration.30

Ingrained Prejudice and the Rise of Nationalism
Many authors also highlight the presence of anti-Roma sentiments at all levels of
the political process in Europe, connecting historically ingrained prejudices to presentday impediments to Roma equality. Negative portrayals of Roma in the media and by
government officials proliferate hostility towards this population within member states, at
the levels of the citizenry and administration. Anti-Roma propaganda readily fosters an
image of Roma as criminals, whose lifestyles exist in opposition to that of other
Europeans—not unlike the way they were depicted during the Holocaust. The dispersal
of this propaganda has been exasperated with the rise of ethnic nationalism in Europe.
At the lowest level, citizens regularly protest Roma inclusion in every aspect of
social life, severely pitting integration strategies against the wishes of the general
majority. Numerous surveys taken by Roma activist groups and EU organizations report
29

K. Koutouki and D. Farget, “ Contemporary Regulation of Public Policy Participation of the Saami and
Roma: A Truncated Process,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 19, (2012): 429.
30
Ram, 30.
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high percentages of hostility towards Roma across Europe. Beyond just public opinion,
non-Roma citizens often support political leaders and parties that promote the
marginalization of Roma. Ram gives the example of a Czech initiative to eliminate
segregated schools for Roma children, to which the public responded with a petition
against the measure.31 Furthermore, resentment towards Roma within the general
population has facilitated the rise of nationalist political parties that directly and
indirectly promote violence against Roma by ordinary citizens and nationalistic
paramilitary organizations—predominantly in Eastern Europe.32 Ataka, for example, is a
far-right political party in Bulgaria that regularly leads protests and demonstrations
against the inclusion of Roma. Drawing attention to the incendiary slogans employed by
such groups, Ram writes, “In 2011 in Bulgaria, anti-Roma protests led by the right-wing
Ataka party took place in over a dozen cities with banners proclaiming ‘Death to the
Roma people!’ and ‘Turn the Roma people into soap.’”33
More generally, Margareta Matache argues that public hostility towards Roma has
created a political atmosphere where all political actors, regardless of party affiliation,
can successfully gain following with an anti-Roma platform. She observes that, when
coupled with media portrayals that make the Roma out to be a danger to the public, antiRoma platforms are interpreted as protective rather than discriminatory.34 Vermeersch
similarly discusses how anti-Roma ideas are complemented by nationalism in the
political realm. He writes:

31

Ibid, 32, 33.
M. Matache, “The Deficit of EU Democracies: A New Cycle of Violence Against Roma Population,”
Human Rights Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2014): 345.
33
Ram, 34.
34
Matache, 341.
32
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Reinforced political nationalism can create exclusions in a double way: it
preemptively cancels out any external criticism on a human rights record,
because that criticism can be framed as an attack on the nation and hence as
an argument for inward-looking national protection (the argument that
“they” are against “us”); and it foregrounds the idea of ethnonational
belonging as a basis for citizenship at the expense of cultural “others.”35
Regarding the Roma, he notes that the nationalistic preference for state security over
human rights is best illustrated by expulsions, evictions, and—in extreme cases—the
emergence of internment camps to hold unwanted populations.36
In many communities, law enforcement officials are also reported to instigate and
participate in physical assaults against Roma, aided by complacent local politicians and
courts. Blitz cites examples of this in Slovakia and Slovenia, emphasizing police
mistreatment of Roma suspects and the tendency of local courts to overlook and neglect
acts of prejudice and violence against Roma.37 Matache additionally draws attention to
the complicity of political officials, giving numerous examples of police attacks against
Roma that resulted in few ramifications from state or local governments. Of one incident
in Romania she writes:
In the case of Stoica v. Romania, one of the sergeants involved stated that
“the deputy mayor asked the police officers and the public guards to teach
[the Roma boy] and the other Roma a lesson.” (...) While F.L., a young
Roma adolescent was just leaving the bar, the sergeant, D.T. asked him if
he was a “Gypsy (tigan) or Romanian.” F.L. said he was a Gypsy and in
order to teach him “a lesson,” they beat him and the other Roma in the bar
or near the bar. The applicant, C.D.S., a fourteen-year-old Roma boy was
beaten until he lost consciousness by D.T. even though the young boy told
the sergeant that he had just undergone a head surgery.38

35

Vermeersch (2017), 223.
Ibid.
37
Blitz, 1755.
38
Matache, 335, 336.
36
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The officials involved did not receive any punishments at the local or national level, but
Romania was criticised in the ECHR for the actions.
In this example, actors at the transnational level supported the Roma citizens’
case, but EU actors are similarly tinged with the same prejudice that facilitates violence
and exclusion at the local level. Ram underlines the ways that EU officials have added to
the normalization of anti-Roma attitudes by discussing statements made by Viviane
Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship.
Ram writes that in response to a question asking how the EC intended to facilitate
dialogue between member states and Roma civil society, Reding replied that, “‘Roma
communities must [also] help themselves get out of this difficult situation.’”39 Because of
Reding’s elevated position in the EU, her statements give legitimacy to the harmful
propaganda that blames anti-Roma discrimination on the inability of Roma themselves to
correct the problem.

Weakening of the Human Rights Regime
Other authors argue that the weakening of the global human rights regime40 is
largely responsible for the failure of Roma integration strategies in the EU. Vermeersch
highlights how the emergence and strengthening of global human rights standards during
the late 20th and early 21st centuries gave a voice to marginalised groups that had been
continually silenced by their national governments. He explains that, “Over the course of
the 1990s, one could observe the importance of the normative idea that an individual

39

Ram, 29, 30.
Human rights regime refers to the treaties, institutions, and norms charged with protecting human rights
globally. See “The Global Human Rights Regime,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 11, 2012,
https://www.cfr.org/report/global-human-rights-regime.
40
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state’s human rights record is of concern not only to that individual state and its national
citizens, but to the whole world, and that human rights protection is therefore enforceable
across borders through ‘naming and shaming.’”41 For the Roma, especially, this paradigm
shift played a key role in the development of Roma-centered EU directives, but
Vermeersch shows that prolonged reliance on human rights norms has now put the Roma
in a precarious position. Rising nationalist sentiments open up the possibility for the
human rights regime to be framed as an opponent to state sovereignty, which in turn
transforms the rejection of human rights into a useful political tool.42
Moreover, Claude Cahn argues that manipulation of the global human rights
regime has created avenues for states to maintain an appearance of human rights, while in
actuality, they promote exclusion and hostility towards Roma.43 As an example, in the
midst of EU expansion ‘white lists’ were used to determine the viability of asylum claims
of individuals coming from other EU states and the ten countries that were up for
candidacy. ‘White lists’ were made up of states determined to be safe for residents, and
asylum claims of migrants coming from these states could be denied on the grounds that
they were unwarranted. Cahn writes, “As the argument goes, in order to affirm the
commitment to providing asylum to refugees, governments must expel persons who
would corrode and corrupt the asylum system by infecting it with bogus claims to the
need for surrogate international protection.”44 Even populations that faced persistent
discrimination in these states—like Roma in Bulgaria and Romania—could have their
asylum claims denied on this basis.

41

Vermeersch (2017), 222.
Ibid, 223.
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Cahn, 486.
44
Ibid, 486.
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Systemic Impediments to Roma Equality
Union Citizens and Roma Identity
Vermeersch first discusses Roma in terms of post-national citizenship in 2003, in
his article “Ethnic minority identity and movement politics: The case of the Roma in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia.”45 In this account he analyzes three different frames of
Roma identity used by activists to promote Roma equality and integration, as well as the
drawbacks and advantages of each frame. He explains that the idea of post-national Roma
citizenship emerged out of a push towards more transnational methods of activism, and is
inextricably linked to transnational organizations and protections. He also explains that
activists who adopted the post-national frame to advocate for Roma rights readily made
reference to the Roma as their own individual nation.46 Furthermore, Vermeersch
identifies two potential consequences of Roma post-national citizenship that are
especially relevant in terms of EU expansion. First, he writes, “Another contention relates
to the symbolic consequences of considering the Roma a separate nation. Some have
wondered what it would mean to be treated as a nation within another nation. As one
activist asked, ‘Would this mean that, in the Czech Republic, for example, the Roma are
no longer Czechs?’”47 Secondly, he observes that referring to Roma citizenship as postnational semantically absolves states of responsibility for their Roma citizens.
In an article written in 2017, Vermeersch reaffirms these points, and
conceptualizes them within the scope of EU expansion. His main argument equates EU

45

P. Vermeersch, “Ethnic minority identity and movement politics: The case of the Roma in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 26, no. 5 (2003): 879-901.
46
Ibid, 887.
47
Ibid, 889.
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institutions with the transnational rights protecting bodies needed for post-national
activism to be successful. He points out the same consequences of framing Roma as postnational citizens that were discussed in “Ethnic minority identity and movement politics.”
Vermeersch argues:
Such a post-national conceptualization of a group’s identity should, in
theory, perhaps not be entirely problematic, yet, in the absence of a
substantial legal and political European citizenship regime, it can, in
practice, be used to frame the Roma as only European, and therefore not
national or local. This informal status reifies the Roma as a group that is
somehow separate from the national population of a state and does not share
interests with so-called “regular” citizens of that state, who are still
overwhelmingly viewed and defined on the basis of their national
citizenship.48
At the level of member states, national governments are able to apply this concept of
post-national citizenship to both their Roma nationals and Roma migrants. In this way,
they can conflate the two groups, and recognize all Roma residents as “other,” which then
justifies policies that neglect Roma citizens, “even in cases where they have been, in
historical terms, part of the national population.”49 At the transnational level, the
assumption that the EU should be the foremost protector of Roma rights, based on their
post-national citizenship, 50 often leads Roma activists to disappointment. EU expansion,
coupled with a heavy focus on improving Roma relations in candidate countries, placed
high expectations on the capabilities of the EU in this regard.51 Additionally, states have
also situated their neglect of Roma residents in terms of expectations that the EU should

48

Vermeersch (2017), 222.
Ibid, 223.
50
When discussing Roma in the EU, post-national citizenship is almost synonymous with EU or Union
citizens. While Union citizens are explicitly afforded fundamental rights in EU law, the term similarly
suggests that the Roma are “only European, and therefore not national or local,” as stated by Vermeersch
(2017), 222.
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be primarily responsible for post-national citizens. Ultimately, as Vermeersch contends,
“The structures that are needed to improve the situation on the ground for the Roma
(social welfare systems, redistribution mechanisms, and anti-discrimination policies) fall
primarily under the authority of national states, not the European institutions.”52
In the following chapter, I will use the cases of Italy, France, and Sweden as
evidence to show that this concept of Roma post-national citizenship facilitates member
state mistreatment of Roma residents. Moreover, I will explain how expectations that the
EU provide protections for Roma—especially in terms of Union citizenship—are
unfounded, by highlighting the rulings in three ECHR cases.

Economic Growth and Free Movement
In her article, “Are There Fundamental Rights for Roma Beggars in Europe,”
Virpi Makinen analyzes the implementation of the citizens’ rights directive in member
states, relating the economic motives behind the directive to national policies that neglect
poor migrant populations—mainly Roma.53 She highlights how the conditions for
restricting free movement are more frequently applied to Roma migrants than other
Union citizens, specifically citing exclusion from social welfare programs and begging
bans as policies that target poor migrants.
Fundamentally, Makinen states that “the directive is based on the notion that
[Union] citizens54 can support themselves and do not rely on the host country for
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subsistence.”55 However, Roma from poor member states like Romania and Bulgaria see
the right to free movement as a way to escape the harsh economic conditions and
widespread discrimination within their home states. On the other hand, as Makinen
comments, “The liberty to move to another country to beg there does not solve the
underlying problem of the need to beg.”56 To combat the use of the citizens’ rights
directive by economically undesirable migrants, member states adopt policies in
accordance with the directive that simultaneously allow them to ostracize poor migrants.
The “unreasonable burden” clause is applied readily when migrant populations have a
large need for social assistance—which the Roma generally do: member states reject
migrant claims to social welfare programs and expel them on the grounds that their use of
social welfare places an undue burden on the state’s social assistance system. In
denouncing begging and related behaviors as criminal, expulsion can be justified on the
condition for residence that specifies that an individual should not disrupt public order,
security, or health.
Furthermore, the exclusion of Roma migrants on the basis of their low
socioeconomic status can be understood within the frame of transnational European
capitalism. The social exclusion of beggars and criminalization of the poor that
perpetuates their inability to access the labor market resembles the “bloody legislation
against the expropriated,” that Karl Marx writes about in Capital. He writes:
The proletariat created by the breaking up of the bands of feudal retainers
and by the forcible expropriation of the people from the soil, this ‘free’
proletariat could not possibly be absorbed by the nascent manufactures as
fast as it was thrown upon the world (...) They were turned en masse into
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beggars, robbers, vagabonds, partly from inclination, in most cases from
stress of circumstances.57
In this case, the collapse of the feudal system and replacement with capitalist structures,
forced people who had previously sustained themselves through agrarian production to
adapt to the wage labor of an industrialized market. Those who could not do so were
further punished for existing in opposition to the capitalist economy,—the ‘free’
proletariat—with “legislation against vagabondage.”58 In the case of the Roma, through
practices of discrimination and exclusion from social assistance, Roma are sidelined from
the capitalist labor markets of EU member states. Through the criminalization of begging,
Roma face greater oppression for not benefiting the capitalist class.
I will use the arguments of Makinen and Marx to show that the economically
driven components of the citizens’ rights directive disproportionately disadvantage Roma
migrants and other poor Union citizens. In the case of social assistance stipulations, I will
illustrate how exclusion of Roma from these programs in Germany and Belgium
reinforce their socioeconomic status and further marginalize them from greater European
society. Regarding begging bans, I will similarly show how this type of legislation
facilitates the cycle of poverty that isolates Roma to the peripheries of Austria and
Denmark.
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III.

EU Expansion and Confusing Roma Citizenship

In this chapter, I will illustrate how EU expansion and Roma post-national
citizenship have facilitated state neglect of Roma, worsened by weak responses from the
EU. The first section focuses on state responsibility and the influence of EU expansion on
national government approaches to Roma policy. Using the distinct cases of Italy, France,
and Sweden, I will argue that by manipulating the idea of post-national Roma citizenship,
member states are able to persist with Roma abuses. In the second section of this chapter
I will turn to three ECHR cases—Aydarov and Others v. Bulgaria, Kósa v. Hungary, and
Cazacliu and Others v. Romania—to highlight the difficulty of protecting Roma rights
from the perspective of transnational bodies like the EU and ECHR. I will argue that high
expectations for EU intervention in cases of Roma abuse have neglected to acknowledge
the fundamental power structures that constitute the relationship between the EU and its
member states, and that prohibit the EU from assuming complete responsibility over
Union citizens.

State Neglect of Roma Residents
The tendency of member states to disregard their responsibility to Roma residents
is best illustrated by the manner in which national governments organize and promote
mass Roma expulsions. In states where Roma are perceived as a problem by the public or
the government, expulsion of Roma migrants is often promoted as a solution. State
capacity for expelling Roma is bolstered by the ambiguity of their citizenship status. By
considering the Roma to be post-national citizens, member states are able to pursue
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expulsion measures on the basis that Roma problems are best solved in the transnational
realm—by either the states from which they migrate or EU institutions directly.
The citizens’ rights directive defines a Union citizen as “any person having the
nationality of a Member State,” and specifies that “Union citizenship should be the
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States when they exercise their right of
free movement and residence.”59 When Roma are distinguished as post-national citizens,
the term “Union citizen” is more widely applicable, because regardless of where they
reside or migrate, they are never within the bounds of their own state. Framing Roma as
post-national citizens makes overlooking individual Roma citizenship possible, and
beneficial for states with large Roma populations. In equating their Roma nationals to
post-national citizens, states confuse Roma nationals and migrants. Ignorance of this
distinction is detrimental to all Roma living in a particular state, because it allows the
state to pursue policy decisions that focus on one characteristic of the two divergent
groups (Roma nationals and Roma migrants) while neglecting all others. In the cases of
France and Italy, by applying post-national Roma citizenship to all Roma residents,
regardless of their state of origin, both states are able to approach Roma problems with
solely migrants in mind. Consequently, member states adopt strategies that focus on
hindering Roma migration, while forsaking their Roma nationals, who then continue to
face domestic oppression.
By zeroing in on Roma migrants’ motivations for moving to Western nations,
states in which they reside can implement policies that deflect responsibility back to
states where the majority of migrant Roma originate. In doing so, states can then justify
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expulsions, an absence of internal protections for Roma, and repressive methods that are
aimed at impeding future migration. Both France and Sweden take advantage of postnational Roma citizenship to transfer accountability for Roma to poorer Eastern and
Southern European states.
Lastly, states can also manipulate the concept of Union citizenship60 to reject state
obligations to Roma altogether. By emphasizing the crucial role that the EU plays in the
existence of post-national Roma citizenship, states are able to contend that the job of
guaranteeing Roma integration and rights protection inherently falls on the shoulders of
the EU. Even the term itself, “Union citizen,” suggests that the party primarily
responsible for the citizens in question is the EU. The Swedish government, in particular,
has readily used this reasoning to publicly rationalize its treatment of Roma migrants.

Italy
The Italian government notoriously confronts the state’s Roma problem through
forced expulsions and the destruction of settlements, all under the auspices of national
security.61 The hardships faced by Roma in Italy echo the hostility that the general public
feels for them. According to the Pew Research Center, “82% of Italians have an
unfavorable view of Roma,”62 which previous leadership addressed by creating
segregated ghettos.63 Living conditions in ghettos and illegal encampments are unsafe
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and degrading, with cramped trailers,—and other makeshift housing—scarce electricity
and running water, and an absence of proper sanitation.64 For the alleged purpose of
improving standards of living, Italy’s more recent ruling parties have consistently
pursued a strategy focused on dismantling Roma settlements. Notably, in 2018 a camp in
Rome was razed despite repeated petitions to halt the process from Roma residents, the
EU, and the ECHR.65 Protesters objected on the grounds that city officials had not
established substantial plans for rehousing the camp’s residents, and contested that
demolition would result in their displacement. The Italian government moved forward
with the destruction, and—as predicted by protesters—many Roma were left without a
place to go. In footage recorded of residents evacuating the camp, they can be heard
contemplating what to do next, “some saying they were headed to Romania, others
saying they were going back to look for the next place to squat, probably under a
bridge.”66
At the same time that this camp was being dismantled, Italy received even more
condemnation from the international community because of statements made by Interior
Minister Matteo Salvini. Salvini, who is well known for his uncompromising approach to
immigration, called for a census of Roma residents to be conducted. The purpose of the
census would be to identify Roma migrants living illegally in Italy, as a prelude to their
expulsion. Of Roma with Italian citizenship, Salvini lamented, “‘And Italian Roma?
Unfortunately, we have to keep them.’”67 In actuality, over half of the total Roma
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population in Italy are Italian citizens, with some whose families migrated as far back as
the 14th century.68 In response to the Interior Minister’s demands, a spokesperson for a
civil society organization that works to protect Roma rights in Italy noted that, “‘six out
of seven Roma pay taxes,’ [and] most own homes or pay rent.”69 Salvini’s census
proposal and the public support it garnered, reflect the overwhelming support for
expulsions, despite the fact that they would not apply to the majority of Roma residing in
Italy. This conflation of citizen and non-citizen Roma has resulted in repressive domestic
efforts coupled with an erroneous push for migrant expulsions.
Reactions of Italian Roma to the census allude to the influence that post-national
and Union citizen characterizations of Roma have on the state’s approach to such
problems. One Roma citizen, Zanepa Mehmeti, told reporters “‘I feel 100% Italian, but I
regret being born here.’”70 While associating themselves with Italian culture and
nationality, Italian Roma increasingly feel alienated from their home state, and internalize
the foreign identity imposed on them by their government and fellow citizens.

France
Similar to the situation in Italy, the French government has also appropriated
Union citizenship and post-national Roma citizenship to minimize their responsibility for
Roma citizens in France. Additionally, officials have also used these citizenship frames to
justify outsourcing integration efforts to Roma migrants’ home states.71
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In 2010 the French government of Nicolas Sarkozy came under fire from the
European Commission and human rights groups across Europe for expelling thousands of
Roma migrants from Romania and Bulgaria. While Sarkozy’s administration claimed
these expulsions were carried out for national security purposes, the move was widely
understood to be an act of ethnic discrimination.72 Although the events of 2010 received a
significant amount of media attention, they were not anything out of the ordinary for the
French government, which had been conducting expulsions of Roma regularly for the
past few years. Supplementing expulsions, government-sanctioned raids on encampments
and shantytowns are regularly conducted to weed out migrant Roma. Spokespeople for
the French government contested that in 2009 they had returned 10,000 migrant Roma to
their home states without any public outcry.73 In response to the widespread criticism
they received, Sarkozy’s administration sought to assure the public that their actions were
justified, and in accordance with EU human rights norms. Instead of acknowledging the
mass expulsions as such, they reasoned that the Roma affected had voluntarily
repatriated, with the nudging of free airfare and negligible subsidies provided by the
French government.74 Sarkozy also entered into negotiations with Romanian officials in
order to better coordinate Roma integration initiatives within Romania.75
The more liberal administration of François Hollande that followed Sarkozy’s
employed the same strategy, despite Hollande’s fervent denunciation of Sarkozy’s
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methods during the months leading up to the 2012 presidential election. Hollande’s
Interior Minister relayed that repatriation bribes76 had been reduced in price, while
France’s involvement in Romania’s internal Roma integration efforts had increased
significantly. Steven Erlanger writes that the Interior Minister reported France to be
“financing ‘80 microprojects’ in Romania ‘to improve living conditions.’”77 In 2013, a
year after Hollande’s presidential term began, the executive director of the European
Roma Rights Centre stated that, “We expected a different approach, to reduce social
exclusion and economic problems, instead of taking a problem and moving it from one
place to another.’”78
The way that the French government—under both Sarkozy and Hollande—chose
to address France’s Roma problem has done little to combat anti-Roma discrimination.
The frequency of expulsions and preoccupation with promoting Roma inclusion in
Romania are indicative of policy decisions that confuse distinctions between French
Roma nationals and Roma migrants. France is home to approximately 400,000 Roma
with French citizenship, who are equally as affected by the government’s actions as those
who are subject to expulsion. Camps are raided indiscriminately, resulting in the
displacement of French Roma—a consequence of which officials have consistently failed
to attend. After eviction, French Roma are also often denied housing, because of antiRoma prejudice that is deeply ingrained in French society.79 Rather than addressing the
widespread discrimination that isolates Roma to a cycle of poverty, the French
government has chosen to focus only on those Roma that they can expel. In doing so, the
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French Roma are forgotten by the institutions charged with protecting their rights and
freedoms. Instead, French Roma and Roma migrants living in France are combined into
one homogeneous amalgamation in the public consciousness. France’s aversion to
properly distinguishing French Roma policy from migrant policy is owed to the farreaching espousal of Roma as post-national citizens, rather than citizens of individual
states. The French government also uses the idea of post-national Roma citizenship to
further separate itself from any potential allocation of responsibility. The push by both
Sarkozy and Hollande to facilitate coordination between France and member states from
which Roma migrate, mainly Romania and Bulgaria, signifies the focus placed on Union
citizens over their own Roma nationals.

Sweden
Roma residing in Sweden, unlike in Italy and France, are predominantly Union
migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. Because of this, individual citizenship of
Roma migrants is generally ignored, except when used to promote integration strategies
in these states. Notably, the Swedish government manipulates Union citizenship in a way
that implicates the EU in state oppression of Roma, and justifies their internal neglect of
Roma migrants.
Until large waves of Roma migration began after the EU’s expansion, Sweden
had very few Roma and was particularly accepting of immigrants. However, in the face
of large influxes of Roma—who are highly visible in Swedish society as beggars—
xenophobic attitudes proliferated in political and public life.80 Roma in Sweden have
80

S. Castle, “Poor E.U. Migrants Test Limits of Swedish Tolerance,” the New York Times, Aug. 8, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/world/poor-eu-migrants-test-limits-of-swedish-tolerance.html.

30

little access to housing, like those in Italy and France, due to discriminatory practices. As
a result, they live predominantly in illegal settlements where there is almost no access to
running water, electricity, or sanitation.81 More and more frequently, Roma have become
targets of violent attacks, like Gheorge Rancu, who was drenched in chlorine while
sleeping in a park. Swedish police do little to combat attacks on Roma, reportedly giving
“low priority to attacks on the beggars.”82 Amnesty International has also confirmed that
the police readily treat Roma with disdain and aggression, often harassing them and
chasing them from begging locations.83
In order to combat the growth of impoverished Roma populations, the Swedish
government appointed Martin Valfridsson as the National Coordinator for Vulnerable EU
Citizens. While Valfridsson’s main responsibility was to ensure the protection of Roma
rights in Sweden, he has instead focused on the improvement of social integration in
Romania. Regarding the deplorable conditions Roma face in Sweden, Valfridsson
commented that the home states of these migrants should be the parties responsible for
providing them with aid and resources.84 In 2015, the national governments of Sweden
and Romania came to an agreement that was intended to solidify Swedish assistance to
Romanian social programs. The “Joint Declaration” was signed into effect on June 5th,
by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs of Sweden and the Ministry of Labour,
Family, Social Protection and Elderly of Romania. However, the document only
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stipulated that the two countries share “best practices” for the protection of children’s
rights, improvement of social welfare and social security, and the improvement of gender
equality. There were no concrete guidelines for how Sweden should assist Romania; the
document explicitly stated, “The declaration is not intended to create any legally binding
rights or obligations.”85 The lack of substantive content in the declaration suggests that
the Swedish government’s attempts to subdue anti-Roma discrimination in Romania is
not grounded in genuine concern for their rights. Mirroring comments made about
Hollande and Sarkozy’s efforts in France, a Swedish civil society volunteer, Josh Levi,
argued that the tactic only served “‘to move the problem somewhere else.’”86
Highlighting the transnational movement of Roma migrants in relation to their Union
citizenship allows the Swedish government to figuratively “move the problem” to a
different state.
Moreover, Valfridsson has also prioritized reforming existing Swedish policies
that pertain to Roma rights. He has essentially rolled back programs that were introduced
to expand Roma access to social services, which had actually improved living conditions.
As a result, the Swedish government has shifted towards an approach that favors Roma
oppression over emancipation. Valfridsson’s new policies have made housing difficult to
sustain, decreased access to education, social programs, and health resources, and
reinforced public discrimination of Roma. In terms of housing, Valfridsson made it
illegal for localities to offer campsites at a reduced rate, called for the dismantling of
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illegal settlements, and broadened the authority of landowners so they can more easily
evict unemployed Roma. Regarding education, Amnesty International reported that,
“[Valfridsson] also advised schools in Sweden not to accept children from these
communities, on the grounds that this could encourage parents to pull their children out
of school in their home countries.”87 Lastly, he reaffirmed that unemployed migrants
were not allowed access to the social services allocated to Swedish citizens, and noted
publicly that people should refrain from giving money to beggars, as it would further
compel Roma to take advantage of Swedish society. The goal of removing existing
protections, according to Valfridsson, was to dissuade Southern and Eastern European
Roma from migrating to Sweden.88
By framing their overall Roma integration strategy as focused predominantly on
improving living conditions in Union citizens’ home states, the Swedish government can
excuse the abandonment of internal protections as a method for urging other member
states to make social change. Moreover, in Swedish discussion of Roma migrants, Roma
are almost ubiquitously referred to as Union citizens or European Union migrants. When
defending the state’s decision to limit Roma access to healthcare, Valfridsson argued that
“Sweden cannot afford to extend [healthcare] to all 500 million European Union
citizens.”89 Even the title of his position, “National Coordinator for Vulnerable EU
Citizens,” negates the national identity and state citizenship of Roma. The manner in
which Valfridsson discusses Sweden’s responsibility—or lack thereof—to Union citizens
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and the co-opting of this sentiment by the general public, suggest an expectation that the
EU play a greater role in the protection of Union citizens, and Roma in particular.

Conceptualizing Ineffectual EU Responses
The way that the EU functions as a transnational body requires that states
themselves take responsibility for enforcing the directives created by the EU. Rather than
all members abiding by a uniform set of laws, each is required to transpose directives into
national legislation that caters to the complexities of each individual state, while still
upholding the main tenets of the directives. With the expansion of the EU, Roma gained
access to new transnational platforms from which they could advocate for their own
rights, without having to navigate oppressive state governance structures.90 Roma
activism has become very closely tied to EU bodies, and has diverted attention from
national and local efforts towards transnational undertakings. Steady commitment to
transnational activism has led to the development of a post-national Roma identity, which
relies predominantly on EU institutions rather than state or local ones.91 Vermeersch
explains that, “In a way, the EU became for the Roma the most self-evident post-national
avenue toward minority activism and ‘claims making.’ And the EU has indeed more or
less accepted this role.”92 On the other hand, the EU is unable to offer protections and
freedoms to Roma, regardless of whether or not they’re framed as Union citizens,
because this responsibility still belongs to the states.93 As a result, Roma rights groups
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expect the EU to more aggressively enforce directive policies that benefit Roma, and
become disillusioned when it fails to do so.
The constraints placed on the EU in its efforts to protect Roma rights can be
illustrated by rulings of the ECHR in cases brought by wronged Roma. European courts
are the premiere rights-protecting apparatus that the EU has at its disposal, and the only
avenue through which they can directly protect Roma rights. The Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) rules on EU law directly, so if a directive has been violated by a
member state, the European Commission can pursue infringement proceedings through
the CJEU. On a more practical level, the ECHR ensures that individual Roma are able to
seek justice in the event that they are mistreated by state institutions.94
While the ECHR is not an EU institution itself, it rules on the European
Convention of Human Rights, which all EU member states are party to. Moreover,
rulings of the ECHR on cases of Roma discrimination are instrumental in CJEU decisions
to indict states for violating directives. Adam Weiss, a representative for the European
Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), argues that “The European Commission is alone able to
bring such litigation, but it will never police Member States’ violations of the EU law
rights of Roma by itself.”95 As an example, the ECHR’s rulings on D.H. and Others v.
Czech Republic precipitated the pursuit of litigation against the Czech Republic, and
other states guilty of segregating Roma children within school systems, by the CJEU.96
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Moreover, the restrictions placed on the ECHR when litigating offenses of
European states against individuals, demonstrate the constraints placed on transnational
frameworks of human rights protection more generally—like those faced by the EU—
when confronting state sovereignty. ECHR dismissal of Roma cases exhibits the overall
limitations of the EU’s ability to protect Roma, even as they become increasingly
awarded the blanket status—Union citizens. The three cases I will focus on were litigated
on behalf of Roma constituents by the ERRC, which is a strategic law organization that
pursues cases in domestic and international courts “designed to expose and eliminate
discriminatory structures that violate the rights of Roma” in Europe.97 In each case, the
ECHR cites various procedural violations to rule the applicants’ complaints inadmissible,
which consistently contradict one another. In the case of Aydarov and Others v. Bulgaria,
the court reasoned that defendants had both not “exhausted domestic remedies,”98 and
failed to bring their complaint to the ECHR within the allotted time frame, after domestic
remedies had been exhausted. 99 In the second case, Kósa v. Hungary, the court also
rejected the applicant’s complaints because she had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.
However, a human rights NGO had pursued litigation in Hungarian courts on her behalf,
which was ultimately dismissed, complicating the ECHR’s argument.100 In the last case,
Cazacliu and Others v. Romania, the ECHR applied the exhaustion of domestic remedies
argument differently to two groups of applicants party to the same case, so that both of
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their claims were found inadmissible.101 Furthermore, in all three cases, the rulings
followed either the same, or similar logic, as the state’s submission of facts to the court.
This shows that, as a default, transnational bodies must bow to the sovereignty of states,
even when cases clearly disprove their innocence with regard to human rights violations.
In all three cases, that the decisions of the court were based on the “exhaustion of
domestic remedies,” shows the inclination of transnational bodies to rely on state
apparatuses for protecting Roma rights. Furthermore, the dismissal of each case based on
arbitrarily applied procedural violations, rather than substantive analyses of both parties’
claims, is a testament to the EU’s (and transnational bodies’ in general), deference to
state legislation on these matters. Acceptance of member state testimonies over those of
the defendants, coupled with diversion of responsibility back to national courts, show that
the EU has not adapted to its new responsibilities created with the development of Union
citizenship. Instead, the EU must abide by the hierarchical order of responsibility that
prioritizes member state rights over those of disadvantaged individuals within the EU
system, including the Roma. A majority of the cases litigated by the ERRC on behalf of
EU Roma included an inadmissible ruling that favored the testimony of the states, the
occurrence is not just isolated to these cases. Additionally, in the cases where states were
found to have violated the fundamental rights of a Roma applicant, the assertion that such
a violation constitutes ethnic or racial discrimination is regularly dismissed by the
court.102 This also shows preference to state sovereignty, because of the high standard of
proof associated with claims of racial discrimination.
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Aydarov and Others v. Bulgaria
This case was brought to the ECHR on behalf of two Roma families—the
Aydarov family and the Iliev family—whose homes had been targeted for demolition by
the Bulgarian government, resulting in the destruction of the Aydarov family’s home.
Both homes had been unlawfully built, like the majority of houses located in the
Kremikovtsi settlement, which is located in the Garmen municipality and consists of
mostly Roma. Demolition orders came in 2011, after the families had previously been
assured “under the transitional provisions of the Territorial Organisation Act 2001,” that
their homes could remain intact, despite the illegality of their construction.103 At the same
time, “the National Building Control Directorate’s regional office apparently issued a
total of 124 similar demolition orders in relation to houses in the Kremikovtsi
settlement.”104 The Aydarov family had five people living in their home, including three
children, and the Iliev home housed eight people, including six children. Both families
have children with disabilities, including one from the Iliev family who has cerebral palsy
and suffers from complete paralysis. The date of demolition was continually pushed back
by the National Building Control Directorate’s office due to the absence of
accommodations available for the families following the destruction. In July 2015, the
Aydarov family’s home was hastily demolished following anti-Roma rallies in a
neighboring community that protested the settlement in Kremikovsti.
When the two homes were initially ordered for demolition in 2011, the Aydarov
family pursued judicial review based on the assurances of the Territorial Organisation
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Act of 2001, but their claims were dismissed by the local court. The Iliev family did not
seek review of the demolition orders. The order for demolition was suspended,
nevertheless, because a solution had not been developed for rehousing the residents who
would be displaced. After the rallies against the Kremikovsti settlement in 2015, regional
authorities pushed for the enforcement of demolition orders to be expedited. In response,
both the Aydarov family and Iliev family “sought judicial review of the enforcement of
the orders.”105 Their claims were denied by the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court, at
which point the two families appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. This court
denied two aspects of the appeal, but ordered the lower court to review a third aspect
based on a procedural error that had been made the first time. During this hearing the
Blagoevgrad Administrative Court again denied the two families’ cases. The Aydarovs
and Ilievs made another appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, which ruled that the
Iliev family’s claims could be dismissed, but the Aydarov family’s case was eligible for
review by the lower court. In the final iteration of these proceedings, the Blagoevgrad
Administrative Court rejected the Aydarovs’ claims and decided that this “judgement was
not amenable to appeal.”106
The applicants made three main complaints to the ECHR. The first argued that
consequences of the demolition would exceed the severity of the families’ crimes—
building and living in unlawful residences.107 Secondly, they contended that the order to
demolish their homes constituted racial discrimination because the proceedings were
influenced by anti-Roma sentiments of the neighboring community, other unlawful
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residences not belonging to Roma were not targeted, the authorities did not acknowledge
the inability of the families to acquire other housing accommodations, orders persisted
despite not having established accommodations for the displaced, and the authorities’
approach to legal proceedings was inconsistent.108 The third complaint entered by the
families argued that the forced evictions that occured in 2015 violated their right to
protection against inhuman and degrading treatment.109
The ECHR ultimately determined all of the applicants’ claims to be inadmissible.
For the first claim, the court argued that because the case was brought to the ECHR in
2015, claims that referenced events that had happened when the demolition was initially
ordered in 2011 were out of time.110 In other words, the applicants should have sought
redress for this claim immediately after initial requests for judicial review were denied by
local courts.111 In this case, the court did not acknowledge the postponement of
demolition proceedings, which likely gave applicants a false sense of security and kept
them from pursuing higher order litigation. Regarding the second complaint, the ECHR
also decided that this claim was inadmissible. They reasoned that domestic remedies had
not been exhausted for pursuing claims of racial discrimination.112 Here, the court’s
ruling ignores the many other requests for judicial review by the applicants that were
repeatedly rejected. Although none of the domestic complaints the families had filed
pertained explicitly to racial discrimination, the consistent dismissal of their other
requests could easily make pursuing recourse on these grounds seem futile. Lastly, the
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ECHR ruled the third complaint inadmissible, also because it came “out of time.”113
However, the evictions occured in the midst of the ECHR litigation, at which time both
families were preoccupied with seeking judicial review in domestic courts and keeping
up with the European Court’s proceedings.114 In the Bulgarian government’s submission
to the court, they claimed that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies, and
that their complaint was out of time, which is congruent with the ECHR’s rulings. The
ECHR even cites the Bulgarian government’s testimony in their assessment of the
case.115

Kósa v. Hungary
The applicant in this case was a young student—Kósa—who complained to the
ECHR that she had been unlawfully discriminated against in the form of school
segregation. In September 2011, following the closure of a primary school in the Huszár
township, the Greek Catholic Church opened a school in the same area, unaffiliated with
state sponsored primary schools. The Huszár township is a community of primarily Roma
people in Nyíregyháza, Hungary. Prior to this, the Hungarian government had provided
bussing for students who had been disadvantaged by the closing of the Huszár township’s
school, so they could attend other schools within Nyíregyháza. Once the Church’s
school—the Sója Miklós School—opened, the bussing was discontinued and replaced
with government subsidies to pay for students’ transportation. Kósa began attending the
Sója Miklós School, but after two years she transferred to one that was farther away, with
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the help of the Chance for Children Foundation (CFCF)—a Hungarian NGO.116
However, even with the subsidies provided, the cost of transportation to and from Kósa’s
school outside of Huszár makes up approximately 40% of her family’s monthly
income.117
Kósa complained to the ECHR that her right to equal education had been
infringed upon, arguing that the discontinuation of state funded busses forced her to
attend the Sója Miklós School, which was segregated.118 Before Kósa brought her case to
the ECHR, the CFCF pursued litigation in Hungarian court contesting the nature of
school segregation, as experienced by Kósa and other Roma students. The CFCF’s claims
made against the Municipality and the Greek Catholic Church’s two primary schools
were substantiated by the Nyíregyháza High Court, but not its claims against the
Klebelsberg Institution Management Centre (KLIK)—the state apparatus responsible for
ensuring equal access to public schooling. However, the decisions of the Nyíregyháza
High Court were later overturned by the Supreme Court of Hungary, and the CFCF’s
case was completely dismissed.119
Regarding Kósa’s individual case, the ECHR ruled that her complaints were
inadmissible because she had not exhausted domestic remedies. This ruling mirrored the
submission of the Hungarian government to the ECHR: “The Government raised an
objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the public action
brought by the CFCF had not exempted the applicant from the obligation to bring an
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action concerning her own specific circumstances.”120 They argued that the CFCF’s case
was litigated in their own name, and applied more broadly to school segregation than her
individual complaints. Although the CFCF’s claims were rejected at the level of the
Supreme Court, the ECHR contended that if Kósa had pursued legal recourse pertaining
only to her personal grievances at the domestic level, Hungarian courts may have ruled in
her favor. In turn, Kósa argued that components of the CFCF’s case were influenced by
her specific circumstances, and that she had assumed the Supreme Court’s dismissal to
constitute exhaustion of domestic resources.121

Cazacliu and Others v. Romania
Lastly, in this case, the ERRC brought claims to the ECHR on behalf of seventysix Roma who had been forcefully evicted from their shared residence in 2006. The
housing subsequently offered by the state consisted of a deteriorating army barrack or
mobile homes located in close proximity to a waste dump. The second location lacked
water and sanitation, and was riddled with harmful pollutants from the dump.122 A
portion of the Roma affected pursued recourse in domestic courts, while the rest were
only represented in the ECHR case. Those who had brought the issue to Romanian courts
were given €450 as compensation for the state’s violation of their human rights.123
In 2006, when the applicants were evicted, “Romanian law did not provide
adequate remedies against this kind of eviction.”124 The ERRC argued that because there
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were no clear domestic avenues to pursue the residents’ complaints, it was not necessary
for them to have exhausted all domestic remedies before bringing the case to the ECHR.
In their ruling, the court manipulated the ERRC’s domestic remedy argument to
determine the claims of all seventy-six applicants inadmissible. Regarding the Roma who
had been awarded compensation in Romanian courts, the ECHR concluded that the
money they had been repaid was a sufficient resolution to the human rights violations
they had suffered. As a result, no further legal action against the Romanian government
could be taken. Moreover, because these applicants’ grievances had been redressed, the
court denounced the ERRC’s argument that the “exhaustion of domestic remedies” was
inapplicable to this particular case. The complaints of Roma who did not take up
domestic litigation were then ruled inadmissible on the grounds that they “should have
done so.”125 Again, like the previous two cases, the ruling of the ECHR almost exactly
followed the logic of the Romanian government’s submission of the facts.126

Conclusion
In all three cases, the ECHR’s reference to each member state’s testimony
reaffirms that transnational institutions like the ECHR and EU—while championing the
rights of minorities across states—still must bow to the discretion of states for the
preservation of state sovereignty. The narrow reach of the EU in this regard, and concepts
of Union citizenship and post-national Roma citizenship that allow states to disregard
their Roma citizens, proliferate abuses of Roma in the EU and provide few avenues for
substantive change to be pursued by Roma themselves.
125
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IV.

Free Movement for Capitalism

In this chapter, I will provide evidence to show that the expansion of the
European Union for fundamentally capitalistic purposes has seriously disadvantaged
Europe’s poorest populations—especially the Roma. There are two components of the
citizens’ rights directive that member states consistently exploit to target unwanted Roma
migrants. First, under the directive, states reserve the right to withhold social assistance to
any unemployed resident, and expel migrants who place an undue burden on the social
assistance system of the state. Using the cases of Germany and Belgium, I will illustrate
how these stipulations put Roma migrants in a particularly precarious position regarding
their right to residence. Second, the directive also allows states to expel migrants who
pose a threat to public policy, security, or health. The public activities of impoverished
Roma—such as begging, squatting, and rough sleeping127—are regularly represented as
threats to public order. In Austria and Denmark, this manipulation of the citizens’ rights
directive is used to expel migrant Roma and criminalize their presence in the public
sphere. To explain the specific policy measures that states have adopted on this issue, I
take data primarily from the first and second monitoring reports on the National Roma
Integration Strategies (NRIS) of member states.128

“Unreasonable Burden” and Social Welfare Conditionality
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The right to movement and residence of Union citizens is endowed upon any
national of an EU member state and their family.129 However, the preservation of right to
residence within a particular member state is subject to different conditions depending on
the length of stay. For the first three months of a Union citizens’ residence in a host state,
the only requirement is that they can provide the relevant authorities with a passport or
identification card from another member state.130 Within this time frame, Union citizens
can be expelled if the state can reasonably prove that they are “an unreasonable burden
on the social assistance system of the host Member State.”131 After a period of three
months, Union citizens who are employed or self-employed automatically retain their
residence. Unemployed persons can remain in their host state after three months if they
can provide evidence that they are seeking employment and “have a genuine chance of
being engaged,”132 “have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members
not to become a burden on the social assistance system (...) and have comprehensive
sickness insurance cover in the host Member State.”133 Provisions for access to social
assistance are more dependent on the employment status of the Union citizen in question.
For the entirety of their residence, employed or self-employed Union citizens are
guaranteed social assistance by host member states. Regarding the unemployed, social
assistance is not guaranteed by the citizens’ rights directive and falls under the discretion
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of member states.134 Accordingly, member states have adopted different requirements for
access to social assistance based on the specific circumstances of each state.
In states where social assistance is completely restricted, or based on other
conditions that are notably harder for Roma to satisfy, a tremendous amount of strain is
placed on Roma migrants’ ability to secure housing, access healthcare and childcare
services, enroll their children in school, and obtain steady employment. In Germany,
Union citizens’ rights to social assistance are determined by a combination of
employment, income level, and length of time lived in Germany. These conditions hinder
Roma access to healthcare, childcare, and services that provide assistance to job seekers.
Moreover, lack of employment for an extended period of time has been cited as cause for
deportation of Union citizens.135 In Belgium, legal status is a precondition for social
housing and healthcare. Inability to secure these two necessities, in turn, makes access to
other social programs more complicated for Roma and increases the potentiality for
expulsion.136

Germany
Since 2014 the German government has consistently implemented policies that
have expanded restrictions on access to social programs for Roma migrants. Like other
Western European nations, Germany saw an influx of Roma migrants from Bulgaria and
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Romania after the expansion process to these countries was completed in 2007. Prior to
this, Germany also had a large population of Roma residents from the western Balkans,
who face an incredible amount of discrimination due to the new policies as well.
However, for the purpose of this chapter I will only be discussing those that migrated
from states within the EU, and which the citizens’ rights directive applies to.137
According to these new policies, Union citizens can only receive social assistance
after a certain period of residence in Germany. For the first five years, they are subject to
approval for programs based on the discretion of the state, which is determined by other
factors such as employment and income level.138 In the case Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig
(2014), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)139 ruled that these policies
were in compliance with EU law.140 In their judgement, the court cites the stipulation in
the citizens’ rights directive that considers the “unreasonable burden” of unemployed
Union citizens, in order to demonstrate the legality of the legislation in question. In the
summary of their findings the CJEU states:
In the case of economically inactive Union citizens whose period of
residence in the host Member State has been longer than three months but
shorter than five year, it must be examined whether their residence complies
with the conditions in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38, which include
the requirement, intended to prevent economically inactive Union citizens
from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of
subsistence, that the economically inactive Union citizen must have
sufficient resources for himself and his family members. Pursuant to that
provision, a Member State must have the possibility of refusing to grant
social benefits to economically inactive Union citizens who exercise their
right to freedom of movement solely in order to obtain another Member
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State’s social assistance although they do not have sufficient resources to
claim a right of residence.141
This policy is pursued more vigorously in the case of Roma migrants because of their low
socio-economic status and prejudiced attitudes against Union citizens from Romania and
Bulgaria.142 Romanian and Bulgarian migrants are equated with Roma in German media
and are regularly accused of partaking in “poverty migration.”143
Exclusion from state funded healthcare, childcare, and social integration programs
are the most detrimental effects of these policies for Roma migrants in Germany. In terms
of healthcare, the German state does not have a uniform set of guidelines for how
municipalities should regulate access to healthcare for vulnerable Union citizens. As a
result, eligibility requirements for social healthcare vary drastically across the country,
with a generally low level of devotion to ensuring Roma social support across the board.
The 2018 monitoring report on implementation of the German NRIS notes, “The
practical consequences of this policy are that in many cities (for example in Frankfurt,
Hamburg and Dortmund) immigrants are now also denied emergency aid as support is
now dependent on employment status.”144 Inability to obtain consistent healthcare
coverage also complicates the right to residence of Roma after their first three months.145
Restrictions added in 2014 also require that applicants provide a tax identification
number in order to receive childcare assistance from the state.146 This policy negatively
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affects the children of unemployed Roma, which perpetuates the cycle of poverty and
need for social assistance that Roma experience.
Paradoxically, specifying employment as a precondition to social assistance bars
Roma from social services that are meant to help them find and sustain employment.
About these types of programs and the discrimination within them, Germany’s 2018
NRIS report explains:
Given that ESF147 support measures often target participants with higher
formal qualifications there was a shortage of low-threshold support
measures. The new restrictions on newcomers accessing welfare support,
which entered into force in 2017, have created further barriers, as they de
facto exclude them from many measures that, like literacy and language
courses, could increase their employment options.148
Lack of employment not only disqualifies Roma migrants from social welfare programs,
but has also been used to justify expulsion in some cities: “In Hamburg, people who have
not taken up work after three months are required to immediately leave the country.”149
Consequently, unemployment and reliance on social assistance programs150 that could
help remedy unemployment are both cause for deportation of Roma migrants in
Germany.

Belgium
Belgium is home to around 10,000 Roma of Belgian nationality and
approximately 30,000 Roma migrants. For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus only
on Roma that maintain the title of Union citizen. Most Roma migrants that reside in
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Belgium are originally from Eastern Europe and began immigrating after the collapse of
the Soviet Union.151
As a general rule, the majority of social assistance programs in Belgium are
restricted to Union citizens with legal status. Similar to the case of Roma migrants in
Germany, this qualification—although seemingly innocuous—is incredibly difficult for
Roma to meet. This is largely due to discrimination in the housing sector; to obtain legal
status in Belgium, Roma migrants must “have an actual residence in Belgium,” which is
further complicated “because landlords are reluctant to the accommodation of large
families.”152 Moreover, evictions are common, and a law prohibiting the act of squatting
that was instituted in 2017 made eviction easier, quicker, and less expensive for
landlords.153 In the case that Roma migrants do find housing, authorities are reported to
“‘[deny Roma] enrolment on municipal registers,” resulting in “withdrawals of residence
permits.’”154
Ironically, access to social housing for Union citizens is contingent on their legal
status (i.e. their acquisition of legal residence). Social housing also has added stipulations
based on the length of a Union citizen’s proposed residence in Belgium and the type of
visa he/she carries.155 Like in Germany, regions and municipalities are granted the right
to institute additional conditions on social housing; in Flanders, for example, recipients
must be able to speak basic Dutch.156 Outside of specific eligibility requirements, social
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housing and emergency shelters in Belgium are insufficiently equipped to accommodate
large families of Roma migrants. Shelters created for mitigating homelessness were
mandated to cater to individuals, and have not been adequately updated with the
emergence of large groups of homeless Roma.157 In the absence of a permanent place of
residence—either social or private—the ability of Roma migrants to enroll their children
in school is significantly constrained. Children who are subject to perpetual migration are
unable to consistently attend one specific educational institution, and the families’ of
homeless children lack the resources to maintain their attendance. For wanderers, strict
adherence to enrollment policies in Belgian schools make it nearly impossible to achieve
a sufficient level of education without living a sedentary lifestyle.158 Regarding homeless
Roma children, the second 2018 monitoring report on the implementation of Belgium’s
NRIS explains:
The General Delegate for the Rights of the Child (GDRC) notes a periodical
increase of school dropouts amongst Roma when comes the end of winter.
This period coincides with the end of “winter plans” and hence, with an
increased number of homeless families. For these families newly deprived
of a shelter, it gets a lot more difficult to ensure their children’s presence in
school.159
Inaccessible education further inhibits the integration of young Roma migrants into
Belgian society.
The difficulties created for Roma migrants by tenuous access to social assistance
programs are augmented when the “unreasonable burden” stipulation of the citizens’
rights directive is applied to them. In Belgium, Roma are readily accused of posing an
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“unreasonable burden” when they seek social assistance, and are subsequently targeted
for expulsion.160 Belgium’s first 2018 NRIS report notes:
They are in a deadlock as long as they do not own a residence permit, they
cannot benefit from social support, and when they apply for social
assistance, the Foreigners Office is likely to withdraw their residence
permit. According to CIRE,161 there is presently a latent fight against social
immigration of EU citizens, in cause of which Roma also risk losing their
residence permit when they obtain work through inclusion programs led by
public social assistance centres or municipalities.162
These two components of the citizens’ rights directive are manipulated in concert with
one another to marginalize and expel Roma migrants.

Criminalization of Poverty through Begging Bans
Like the exploitation of the “unreasonable burden” identifier, the restriction of the
right to residence based on public security, policy, and health is dependent on a
combination of employment status and length of residence. During the first three months
of residence and after, until a Union citizen obtains the status of permanent resident,
expulsion measures can under no circumstances be taken against workers, self-employed
persons, or job-seekers who can prove “that they are continuing to seek employment and
that they have a genuine chance of being engaged.”163 The citizens’ rights directive does,
however, clarify that in order to prevent the abuse of this clause, member states must
consider the principle of proportionality and the individual circumstances of the Union
citizen in question when ordering an expulsion.164 More explicitly, the directive asserts
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that these conditions are intended for the protection of Union citizens that have
successfully integrated into their host member state:
Expulsion of Union citizens and their family members on grounds of public
policy or public security is a measure that can seriously harm persons who,
having availed themselves of the rights and freedoms conferred on them by
the Treaty, have become genuinely integrated into the host Member State.165
Accordingly, the greater the degree of integration of Union citizens and
their family members in the Member State, the greater the degree of
protection against expulsion should be.166
These clauses are generally not applicable to Roma migrants—or any impoverished
migrants—as they are consistently marginalized through other means and commonly
viewed as incompatible with the culture of member states.
Furthermore, although the directive explicitly states that expulsion on the grounds
of public disturbance “[should] not be invoked to serve economic ends,”167 this provision
has been used to justify laws that criminalize poor Union citizens—especially Roma—
and to expel residents that are not contributing to the economy. Begging bans are most
commonly instituted on these grounds, but states also place bans on squatting, rough
sleeping, and other visible activities of homeless migrants. The prohibition of the public
activities of impoverished people ensures their exclusion from the greater capitalist
European society, as punishment for not participating in the labor markets of member
states. Roma absence in the labor market, however, is facilitated first by discrimination
within the market and exclusion from helpful social assistance programs. In this way,—
similar to how Marx describes the collapse of the feudal system—states push Roma out
of the formal economy by catering only to the needs of wealthy Union citizens, and
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subsequently frame Roma as criminals for existing outside the bounds of capitalist
society.168
Many member states have laws banning aggressive begging,169 but more have
begun to adopt stricter constraints on passive begging.170 Local governments in Sweden,
Finland, and Norway have proposed such policies, with varying amounts of success.171
Austria and Denmark both have more robust laws pertaining to these actions. In Austria,
supplemented by a tremendous amount of anti-Roma propaganda, cities have developed
individual legislation to combat Roma begging.172 In Denmark, penalties were recently
raised for instances of begging, streamlining expulsion measures in the case of public
disturbances.173

Austria
Following the pattern of Germany and Belgium, Austria saw an influx of Roma
migrants from Romania and Bulgaria after the expansion of the EU, and has responded
with repressive policies targeted at the poorest of these Union citizens. In the public
sphere, Roma migrants are widely viewed as little more than beggars, and vilified for
their perceived intent to take advantage of Austria’s social welfare system. This
stigmatization of Roma migrants is promoted by politicians at the local level. For
example, “The governor of the province of Vorarlberg, Markus Wallner, stated in

168

Marx, 522.
Begging that involves the use of direct or indirect threats. See Makinen, 205.
170
Begging that is non-confrontational and involves little or no interaction between parties. Ibid.
171
Ibid, 210 and 211.
172
Romano Centro, “Civil society monitoring report on implementation of the national Roma integration
strategies in Austria,” Report for the European Commission, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the
European Union, 2018.
173
Ravnbøl.
169

55

December 2015 that none of the Roma groups in Vorarlberg ‘are interested in learning
the language, no one is interested in real integration, no one is really interested to
participate with regard to work.’”174 This rhetoric fuels support for begging bans, and
prejudice against Roma migrants more generally. Regarding begging specifically, in 2014
Johann Gudenus, a 2017 national parliament elect, and his party publicized—
fraudulently—the epidemic of begging gangs. According to newspapers aligned with his
party that published the propaganda, there were “bosses of a so-called begging mafia
living in palaces in Romania and exploiting beggars in the streets of Austrian cities.”175
Although this is an extreme case, the media in Austria, in concert with government
officials, portrays Roma migrants in a manner that proliferates defamatory conceptions of
Roma beggars as criminals.176
Austria does not have a federal law that specifically prohibits begging or rough
sleeping, but at the local level these behaviors are regulated with varying degrees of
severity.177 Individuals arrested for begging or rough sleeping are fined or imprisoned in
accordance with the punishments established in individual city legislation. For begging,
fines range from €360 to €2,000, and for rough sleeping the maximum fine amount is
€700. There is no secondary punishment for rough sleeping if the fine cannot be paid, but
for violations of the begging ban, inability to pay fines can result in imprisonment,
ranging from one week to four weeks.178 Roma migrants convicted for these acts are put
at a serious disadvantage. In the event that they would be able to pay the allotted fines,
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this would most likely impair them economically. If they cannot pay and are imprisoned,
this further criminalizes them in the eyes of the Austrian state—putting them at greater
risk for expulsion based on presumptions about their threat to public safety.

Denmark
Denmark has more aggressive policies restricting begging and rough sleeping
than Austria, and has received support for their harsh legislation from the Supreme Court
with regard to its compliance with the citizens’ rights directive.179 In 2017 the expansion
of a law banning begging instituted a penalty of “two weeks’ unconditional imprisonment
upon a first-time offence.”180 In relation to Denmark’s Roma migrants, the conditions of
this provision specify that its preferred use is against migrants. Legislation restricting
rough sleeping has also been expanded, and was used in 2017 to arrest and deport a
Union citizen from Romania. This case was reviewed at the level of the Danish Supreme
Court, which determined that it was in compliance with the citizens’ rights directive, in
that the act of rough sleeping was determined to be a threat to public safety. Camilla Ida
Ravnbøl remarks that, “This opens the question as to whether this recent ruling may
potentially set a new line of precedence that increases the legal possibilities for
expulsions of such citizens on the grounds of camping in public places.”181

Conclusion

179

Ravnbøl, 19.
Ibid, 18.
181
Ibid, 19.
180

57

Germany, Belgium, Austria, and Denmark provide just four examples of how
states conflate the economic benefits of the citizens’ rights directive to target Roma
migrants. Many other member states have policies on Union citizen migration that
produce similar effects, including Sweden182 and Finland.183 The restrictions that states
place on social assistance, and their authority to expel immigrants on the basis that they
are an “unreasonable burden” to the social assistance system, or threats to public security,
are mutually reinforcing. They keep Roma impoverished by not allowing sufficient social
help that could assist them in sustaining employment, gaining wealth, and acquiring
housing, and then expel them on the grounds that their unemployment, poverty, and
homelessness are undue burdens on the state or cause a public disturbance. These
restrictions make sustaining residence in member states incredibly difficult for Roma
migrants. Even in situations where Roma are able to remain in their host state for longer
than three months, their quality of life is significantly diminished and they have few
available for trying to reduce the precariousness of their circumstances.
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V.

Conclusion

In my introduction, I asked the question: Why has the EU consistently failed to
protect Roma rights after its expansion into Eastern Europe? Popularization of postnational Roma citizenship, as well as the capitalistic derivatives of the citizens’ rights
directive are both key contributing factors to the EU’s failures. The proliferation of postnational Roma citizenship that coincided with expansion allowed states to appropriate the
concept of a Union citizen to neglect their responsibility to Roma residing within their
country. Italy, France, and Sweden have consistently demonstrated the ease with which
this can be done within the frame of EU policies. Furthermore, the EU is not able to make
up for the absence of state responsibility, because it is constricted by its responsibility to
ensure the sovereignty of member states. A review of ECHR court cases involving Roma
defendants shows the high level of EU support for state autonomy in legal matters, often
with disregard for underlying racist intents of state officials. In the citizens’ rights
directive, stipulations that cite the creation of an “unreasonable burden” or threat to
public safety as grounds for expulsion, isolate Roma from the labor market and greater
society. Exclusion from social assistance programs and begging bans mutually reinforce
the economic turmoil that Roma experience.
In order to address these systemic obstacles to Roma equality in the European
Union, first, member states must acknowledge the national citizenship of the Roma
within their countries, and honor the diversity within the Roma community itself, so as
not to treat all Roma within the frame of mass migration. Second, the EU must reframe
their devotion to free movement in terms that are not economic. Only then will the EU be
better equipped to protect Roma and other poor Union citizens from the discriminatory
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treatment of member states, which continues the cycle of poverty and perpetuates their
social exclusion.
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